Will Türkiye and Indonesia’s Defense Industry Cooperation Maintain Ground? Insights and Challenges
- ISI Secretariat
- Mar 6
- 7 min read
Aisha R. KusumasomantriDirector of Research, Indo Pacific Strategic Intelligence (ISI)
Jeremiah G. LubisJunior Research Fellow, Indo Pacific Strategic Intelligence Undergraduate Student at the International Relations Department, Universitas Indonesia
This Article is originally posted in the Jakarta Post: https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2025/03/06/will-turkey-and-indonesias-defense-industry-cooperation-thrive.html
During a recent visit to Jakarta by Turkish President Erdogan, several agreements on memorandums of understanding were signed, including regarding the defense sector. Among these, a joint venture on the establishment of a drone factory between the Turkish Baykar and Republikorp companies and Indonesian counterparts was agreed. Indonesian President Prabowo even added that he wishes for both to engage in joint defense equipment and infrastructure production efforts within the industry moving forward.
Historically, this intention is not the first of its kind. For some time, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea have managed to engage in deep and meaningful defense industry relations that reached beyond arms procurement and transfers of technology, but also joint production efforts. Starting in 2010, for example, Indonesia through PT Dirgantara alongside Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and the Korean government worked on developing KAI KF-21 Boramae, a multirole fighter aircraft with stealth technology. As part of a technology transfer agreement, PT PAL and Daewoo Shipbuilding of Korea also agreed to build a third Nagapasa-class submarine, the KRI Alugoro 405 in Surabaya, with the first two others as part of an order built in Korea.
Albeit so, cooperation between the both have not always been the smoothest. Within the production of the KF-21 aircraft, developments became obstructed when Indonesia failed to account for its 20% share of financing the project. Despite the intended transfer of technology goal, some suggest that Alugoro’s production also failed to substantively empower the Indonesian expertise and growth as gradual processes of knowledge transfer became halted in certain phases. This instance raises the question of whether Indonesia and Türkiye’s defense industry cooperation can really engage deeply and successfully..
A Strong Bond? Indonesia and Türkiye’s Defense Industry Cooperation Overview
Defense relations between Indonesia and Türkiye strengthened in 2010 when both countries agreed to a defense industry cooperation agreement in 2010, following returned visits from both President Yudhoyono and President Gül to Ankara and Jakarta. Starting in 2012, the two also formalized this agreement by agreeing to convene annual Defense Industry Cooperation Meetings (DICM), aimed at capacity building efforts and building tighter connections through close-knit dialogues. Further, president-elect Prabowo Subianto’s 2024 visit to President Erdogan in Ankara, following President Erdogan’s courtesy visit to Indonesia, discussing the need and interest of Indonesia to strategically continue strategic defense and industrial partnership with Türkiye displays a steadfast commitment between both countries to pursue deeper ties in defense partnerships. These growing interactions across years, notwithstanding other defense-related visits, dialogues, and routine navy training all show both countries’ strong commitment to deepen ties in the defense sector.
Indonesia and Türkiye’s diplomatic defense cooperation can be seen as most significant particularly in the defense-industry cooperation sector. Türkiye's well-developed defense industry provides Indonesia with access to advanced military technology, including drones, naval systems, and armored vehicles. In collaborating, both business-to-business (B2B) and government-to-government (G2G) partnerships can be seen to continuously grow and widen in both numbers and types of weapons and defense infrastructures being developed. Beyond transfers of technology, knowledge-sharing, and equipment purchasing agreements, cooperation between both have also reached into efforts of co-producing defense infrastructures and equipment. A notable example is Indonesia’s PT Pindad and Türkiye’s FNSS collaboration in developing the Kaplan or Harimau Medium Modern Weight Tank back in 2015–2018. This practice of co-development thus enables Indonesia to boost its indigenous defense capabilities—strengthening it as a key player in the region.
Moreover, on the 27th of August 2024, PT PAL, Indonesia’s state-owned military ship and boat company, met and agreed on deepening several strategic cooperation terms with Turkish-owned defense industries in Jakarta. Overseen by Indonesia’s Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto and Türkiye’s SSB Executive, Haluk Görgün, both industries agreed on developing more advanced equipment ahead, while also building mutual capacity towards both states’ military and defense industries. This agreement now represents an even more significant advancement in the defense relations between Indonesia and Türkiye.
A Partner with Growing Significance and Mutual Benefits: Can They Move Ahead?
The continuous cooperation between the two countries is further growing in significance. Through collaborating in the defense industry, Indonesia can decrease its reliance upon traditional defense equipment suppliers, allowing itself to enhance its strategic defense autonomy. Moreover, joint ventures between Indonesia and Türkiye in the defense industry and equipment manufacturing, both via B2B and/or G2G models, can help stimulate widened economic cooperation and opportunities, all while boosting Indonesia’s growth in the defense sector. Furthermore, Türkiye's flexible approach to defense solutions allows for customized cooperation, aligning with Indonesia’s specific defense needs. Paired with Türkiye’s willingness to readily engage and support offset agreements with Indonesia, this cooperation can be seen to potentially grow into deeper endeavors in the future. As discussed in many bilateral meetings, a draft Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) is as of right now being discussed and is bound to be concluded in the upcoming future.
At the same time, the growing cooperation offers mutual benefits to Türkiye. Through close ties with Indonesia, Türkiye gains a foothold in Southeast Asia and Indonesia when it comes to strengthening its defense capabilities. Also, by cooperating with Indonesia, Türkiye receives access to collaborate with Indonesia’s partners in multilateral settings. The Multilevel Naval Exercise ‘Komodo’ (MNEK), for example, allows Türkiye alongside several powers to engage in capacity building and confidence-building measures by participating in the event, pioneered and spearheaded by Indonesia.
Though equally compatible, a question raised is whether both can find sustainable ground in maintaining such a defense cooperation. Observing Indonesia’s previous history of fiscal instability and dynamic defense budgets, sustaining cooperation may be a challenge. Under President Prabowo, however, new light may be shed. As the new national budget is introduced, the defense sector is projected to be given an upgrade in budgets of up to 1.5% of Indonesia’s total GDP, compared to 2024 where budgets were only 0.78% of the entire nation’s GDP. The promise brought is that within such an increase, arms and equipment modernization, including through procurement and co-production efforts, will be carried out. There is hope that within such an increase, the government will put focus on deepening collaborations with Türkiye ahead.
As per today, both in arms and equipment procurement, including domestic acquisition efforts, by quantity, however, Türkiye still isn’t the largest defense industry partner for Indonesia by quantity. Albeit so, it is worthy to note that in the past, co-production efforts, like the Kaplan Tank successfully materialized. This, alongside Indonesia’s planned DCA with Türkiye, serves as a strong foundation for further avenues of partnership to happen.
Amongst several partnerships, Indonesian orders were the largest for UAVs and drones (12 ISR UAVs from Anka-S in 2023) and missiles. Interestingly, this particular sector is an area the 2025 MoU sought to further explore in joint ventures. In this direction, we can project that the government sees Türkiye as a growing power in the sector, and thus can be a specialized partner within further drone cooperation. Last October, during a seminar, Head of the Indonesian Air Force Staff, Marshall Tonny Harjono specified that within a question raised by Prabowo, when still acting as defense minister, the Air Force explicitly showed interest and need towards more drones and its development ahead. The goal intended is to achieve better mastery in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, especially in geographically harsh areas, like the mountainous topographies of Papua where KKB rebels settle in. In corresponding sense, we can see that Indonesia is now finding clear grounds of partnership with Türkiye, as a pressing need of theirs can be supplemented by defence industry partnerships. This, alongside further warming relations with Türkiye may serve as grounds where both countries can perpetuate their collaboration.Moving forward, the successful relationship between both countries in defense cooperation can pave the way towards broader strategic partnerships, magnifying bilateral ties between Indonesia and Türkiye further. Starting to reduce import efforts to the West, especially after the United States’s sanction against Türkiye’s SSB as part of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) list, Indonesia can now be among the growing partner list Türkiye seeks to work with.
Although so, the growing momentum must be nurtured with care as to ensure that both countries can manage to maintain firm and independent defense postures ahead. In achieving this, several things need to be considered. First, in an increasingly polarized global political structure, Türkiye and Indonesia must maintain their commitment in becoming independent strategic actors in their respective regions. In this manner, both countries can continue to expand their equipment and defense capabilities while neither actively defying nor siding with specific bows of power. Such a posture will not only be beneficial in showcasing how independent actors can maintain their significance in the polarized status quo, but also in ensuring that bilateral relations between both Indonesia and Türkiye can be further developed deeper.
Second, learning from previous collaborations, Indonesia and Türkiye should invest full commitment towards their partnership to fully ensure transfer of technology efforts, including co-development can fully empower both sides. In several iterations, unstable budgets and complex bureaucratic processes made it hard for Indonesia and its Korean partners, for example, to fully ensure that all phases of knowledge sharing become materialized. The Ministry of Defense thus needs to map failures and come up with strategic action plans before it engages in further cooperation. In this regard, the possibility for prolonged, perpetuated relations, will become more prudent.
In years ahead, Indonesia and Türkiye must remain committed in continuing its cooperation and engaging towards deeper means of cooperation, which will situate both states interdependently. Aligning both states to independently pursue a non-aligned strategic culture will also be important to manage both parties’ trust in creating a long term collaboration. To accelerate the cooperation further, Indonesia and Türkiye should also look upon concluding its DCA-drafting process and move into signing in the near future, which will be monumental in expanding relations beyond in more avenues ahead.
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