The Kashmir 2025 Crisis: Data Fusion and the Changing Nature of Air Warfare
- ISI Secretariat
- 6 hours ago
- 6 min read
By: Alfa Yoga Amadeus Daryana
Alfa Yoga Amadeus Daryana is a Research Assistant at Indo-Pacific Strategic Intelligence (ISI), focusing on defense policy and defense equipment in the Indo-Pacific region. He graduated with a degree in International Relations from Universitas Indonesia, specializing in strategic studies and regional affairs.
In early May 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor, a joint military campaign targeting what it identified as terrorist infrastructure within Pakistani territory and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The operation was triggered by the 22 April Pahalgam terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, which resulted in the deaths of 26 civilians, with the majority being Hindu tourists. Departing from earlier patterns of limited retaliation, the crisis rapidly escalated beyond routine border skirmishes, as Indian officials framed the operation as an expression of a hardened counter-terrorism doctrine emphasizing deep, multi-domain precision strikes into Pakistani territory. Despite the initial intensity of the confrontation, both sides soon agreed to a stand-down and withdrew from forward positions, driven by the persistent risk of nuclear escalation and mounting international pressure to prevent a wider regional conflict. This episode yields several important insights into contemporary air warfare; accordingly, this article focuses on a comparative analysis of the Dassault Rafale and the Chengdu J-10C, with particular emphasis on the role of data fusion, algorithmic warfare and the evolution of the air domain, and the long-term strategic implications of the conflict.
Conducted on the night of 6–7 May, Operation Sindoor constituted a coordinated, multi-domain Indian offensive against targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The operation reportedly involved approximately 72 Indian Air Force aircraft, including Rafale, Mirage 2000, and Su-30MKI platforms, operating in synchronized waves and relying heavily on standoff precision weapons, notably SCALP cruise missiles with ranges exceeding 500 kilometers and AASM Hammer precision-guided munitions, to strike targets while mostly avoiding entry into Pakistani airspace. These air operations were reinforced by the deployment of unmanned systems, including loitering munitions and MQ-9B drones, used for intelligence, surveillance, and precision strikes against air defense assets and military-linked urban targets, particularly in Lahore and Rawalpindi. In response, Pakistan launched Operation Bunyanun Marsoos, employing its own precision-guided munitions and a large-scale drone campaign, reportedly involving 300–400 drones against 26 locations across India. Pakistan’s Information Minister, Attaullah Tarar, claimed that Pakistani forces had downed five Indian fighter aircraft, a combat drone, and several quadcopters.
The conflict provided the first instance of near-peer combat data involving the Rafale and the J-10C, revealing sharply contrasting operational concepts. India aimed to leverage the Rafale’s multirole versatility to conduct deep precision strikes, while Pakistan employed the J-10C as a specialized interceptor embedded within a highly integrated system of systems. During Operation Sindoor, the Rafale functioned as the Indian Air Force’s principal strike platform, delivering SCALP cruise missiles and AASM Hammer munitions against targets deep within Pakistan’s Punjabi heartland, including Bahawalpur and Muridke. Despite its advanced capabilities, the operation exposed vulnerabilities, with the shootdown of a Rafale marking the aircraft’s first confirmed combat loss. Indian Air Force sources suggest that political constraints initially limited strikes to designated terrorist sites, leaving Pakistani air defenses and fighter assets untouched in the first wave and enabling the Pakistan Air Force to respond from a position of relative safety.
In contrast, the Pakistan Air Force employed the J-10C as the tip of its air-combat spear, achieving notable success through the use of the Chinese-made PL-15 beyond-visual-range missile. The missile’s extended range and active radar guidance enabled engagements at extreme distances, while J-10C aircraft operated with radars largely silent, relying instead on targeting data provided by AEW&C platforms, most notably the Saab 2000 Erieye, to enhance survivability and situational awareness. A Rafale was reportedly downed at a range of approximately 180–182 kilometers, an unusually long-distance interception that afforded the Indian pilot minimal warning. Although Pakistan’s claim of five Indian aircraft destroyed remains disputed, independent assessments confirmed at least three Indian losses, underscoring the operational effectiveness of the J-10C–PL-15 combination during the May 2025 air campaign.
These combat outcomes underscored a decisive contrast between platform-centric and system-centric approaches to air warfare. While the Rafale remains a highly versatile and capable individual platform, Pakistan’s effectiveness in early beyond-visual-range (BVR) engagements stemmed less from platform superiority than from the robustness of its integrated kill chain. The Pakistan Air Force’s ability to seamlessly link J-10C fighters with airborne early warning assets and ground-based sensor networks proved more operationally decisive than India’s technologically heterogeneous air force, which combines Russian, French, Israeli, and indigenous systems and consequently faces greater challenges in achieving unified data fusion.
At the tactical level, data fusion emerged as the critical enabler of Pakistan’s success, including the first confirmed combat downing of a Rafale. By integrating inputs from AEW&C aircraft, ground-based radars, electronic surveillance, and reportedly space-based sensors, the Pakistan Air Force maintained a comprehensive, real-time air picture that enabled precisely timed interceptor launches and effective third-party targeting. This architecture allowed J-10C aircraft to operate with radars largely silent while receiving targeting cues from platforms such as the Saab 2000 Erieye, leaving Indian pilots with minimal warning, as illustrated by the reported 180-kilometer PL-15 interception. Collectively, these dynamics highlighted the operational advantage of Pakistan’s more unified, Chinese-origin systems architecture over India’s mixed-technology force structure.
At the strategic level, data fusion enabled Pakistan to partially offset its broader conventional disadvantages by securing an informational edge at the tactical level, ensuring persistent sensor visibility while degrading Indian situational awareness. This dynamic may be likened to a blindfolded boxer guided by an external observer: the fighter does not need to perceive the opponent directly, as targeting data is continuously supplied through a networked system.
Beyond the air domain, the crisis also signaled the emergence of algorithmic warfare in the Indo-Pacific, as conflict expanded into the electromagnetic, cyber, and information domains. India reportedly employed AI-enabled swarm drones for real-time targeting and accelerated decision-making, aiming to impose strategic fatigue on Pakistani forces. Pakistan, in turn, allegedly conducted a cyber offensive under Operation Bunyanun Marsoos, targeting Indian digital infrastructure and reportedly disrupting a significant portion of the Maharashtra power grid. Concurrently, both states engaged in intensified information warfare, with competing and often unverified claims circulated and contested in real time, underscoring the growing role of data, algorithms, and perception management in contemporary conflict.
On the basis of the preceding analysis, several key conclusions can be drawn regarding the dynamics of the May 2025 India–Pakistan air conflict and its implications for Indo-Pacific security. The confrontation highlights a widening gap between strategic advantage and tactical vulnerability, as India’s conventional superiority and ability to manage escalation did not fully shield it from losses inflicted by Pakistan’s integrated air-defense network and Chinese-made BVR systems. Moreover, the operational performance of the J-10C and PL-15 provided a reputational boost to non-Western military technologies, potentially reshaping future defense procurement patterns across the Global South. The conflict also reinforces the emergence of a drone–missile paradigm, in which crewed combat aircraft increasingly function as command-and-control nodes, while the primary burden of kinetic operations is assumed by missiles, rockets, and unmanned systems.
More broadly, the May 2025 crisis suggests that South Asia’s strategic calculus has entered a more volatile phase, in which the risks of miscalculation or irrational response are amplified by the speed, opacity, and automation associated with algorithmic warfare. Although a ceasefire currently holds, the underlying structural drivers of instability including the unresolved status of Kashmir and disputes surrounding the Indus Waters Treaty remain intact. In this context, the India–Pakistan relationship is best understood not as a static stalemate, but as a high-stakes form of technological chess, in which drones and algorithms move faster than human decision-making cycles, and where any misstep carries the potential for rapid and uncontrollable escalation.
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