Placing ASEAN amidst a growing US-China competition

By: Curie Maharani and Wendy A. Prajuli

17 March 2025

ASEAN must reinforce its unity and centrality, leveraging strategic partnerships like India to navigate shifting geopolitics.

The United States (US) President Donald Trump’s appointment of a hawkish, anti-Chinese secretary of state and a defence minister signalled that future US policy would not only escalate Indo-Pacific tensions but also sideline ASEAN.  ASEAN must not be caught off guard, as was Europe. ASEAN must reinforce its unity, centrality and resilience by tapping into like-minded strategic partners such as India, with emerging influence and converging interests..

Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine signalled a sharp break from traditional alliances, emphasising unilateralism over multilateral engagement. His second administration is poised to double down on its first policies, adopting an even more transactional and revisionist approach.

In the Western Hemisphere, the US government sought to consolidate its influence over America and Greenland, even resorting to a threat of coercion. However, his approach toward ‘peace’ in Europe was widely seen as favouring Russia at Ukraine’s expense. Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Jordan and Egypt were pressured to accept Palestinian refugees or face cuts to US aid as part of Trump’s controversial Gaza reconstruction plan.

Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine signalled a sharp break from traditional alliances, emphasising unilateralism over multilateral engagement.

Now, attention turns to how his second administration might reshape US policy in the Indo-Pacific, amidst internal debates over whether the region should be America’s new strategic priority. Previously, the Biden administration believed that denying Russia a victory in Ukraine was crucial to deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. While Trump’s administration no longer feels the need to condemn Russia for its war with Ukraine, its stance against China has hardened.

The key to understanding Trump’s approach to China lies in his ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA) doctrine, which frames China as the US’ primary ideological, geopolitical, and economic rival. During his first administration, Trump initiated a new era of strained US- China relations through a trade war, the China Initiative, sanctions on tech giants like Huawei, and criticism of China’s handling of COVID-19.

In his second term, Trump is expected to take an even harder stance by imposing higher tariffs under the ‘Fair and Reciprocal Plan’ and strengthening alliances, further escalating tensions. In response, China is likely to retaliate with another trade war, including tariffs of 15 percent on coal and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), 10 percent on crude oil, agricultural machinery, and large-displacement vehicles, as well as export controls on 25 rare earth metals critical to key industries. Additionally, China has launched an antitrust probe into Google and placed two US companies on its Unreliable Entities List, signalling a deepening economic confrontation.

Trump is expected to take an even harder stance by imposing higher tariffs under the ‘Fair and Reciprocal Plan’ and strengthening alliances, further escalating tensions.

ASEAN: Amidst a sea of options

Trump’s return presents ASEAN with both challenges and opportunities. His protectionist policies could disrupt Southeast Asia’s trade and investment flows, which rely heavily on the US. The US-ASEAN trade was worth US$ 476.8 billion in 2024, with a trade deficit of US$227.7 billion.

In the past, most notably in Vietnam,  investment opportunities were diverted to Southeast Asia. Today, Vietnam is the most vulnerable to US tariffs due to its dependence on the US market (exports to the US account for 30 percent of its Gross Domestic Product or US$142.4 billion) and enjoying the fourth largest surplus among all US trade partners after China, European Union, and Mexico.

Furthermore, amid the US-China trade war, ASEAN risked drowning in the tsunami of cheap Chinese goods. This could force ASEAN to recalibrate its economic strategies to strengthen regional integration and seek alternative partnerships beyond the US.

Trump’s confrontational approach toward China will likely escalate regional tensions, with the Philippines emerging as the primary beneficiary of Washington’s more hawkish strategy. As a key US security ally, Manila relies on this partnership to counter China’s grey zone activities in the South China Sea.

The Philippine Navy has observed a decline in illegal and coercive actions by China’s People’s Liberation Army throughout multilateral and bilateral maritime cooperation activities.

The US remains the region’s largest provider of joint military exercises—far surpassing China—not only for capacity and confidence-building measures but also to boost deterrence. The Philippine Navy has observed a decline in illegal and coercive actions by China’s People’s Liberation Army throughout multilateral and bilateral maritime cooperation activities.

Meanwhile, countries that prefer a quieter approach to crisis management in the South China Sea, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, may struggle to maintain relevance and avoid being sidelined under Trump’s more aggressive Indo-Pacific strategy.

While American Defence Minister Hegseth may lack knowledge of ASEAN, Secretary of State Mark Rubio’s decision to prioritise calls with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia— after the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Initiative)—suggests that ASEAN still holds strategic importance. However, whether this translates into a deeper and more consistent US engagement or remains a largely transactional approach remains to be seen.

What must ASEAN do?

ASEAN must adopt proactive measures to mitigate the impacts of geopolitical changes. First and foremost, ASEAN must enhance its cohesion. China's growing heft in the region presents a potential risk of entangling ASEAN in the conflict between China and the US, particularly under Trump’s leadership.

This shift in influence is highlighted in the ISEAS survey, "The State of Southeast Asia 2024," where 50.5 percent of Southeast Asian respondents favoured China over the US, a significant increase from 38.9 percent the previous year. Furthermore, China is perceived as the most strategically fundamental partner, receiving a mean score of 8.98 out of 11, marginally ahead of the US at 8.79. To navigate this landscape, ASEAN should emphasise greater regional integration and connectivity to bolster its cohesion.

The organisation can use the ASEAN centrality framework to encourage the conflicting parties to adhere to established international norms.

Secondly, ASEAN must strengthen its centrality in the context of the China-US conflict. While some question the effectiveness of ASEAN's central role, it remains a vital mechanism for addressing tensions and disputes with external powers. The organisation can use the ASEAN centrality framework to encourage the conflicting parties to adhere to established international norms.

ASEAN should actively strengthen its cooperation with like-minded countries to promote regional stability and peace. As a country with shared interests, India is emerging as a vital neighbour in this effort.

India’s presence

India's ‘Look East’ policy, which has evolved into the ‘Act East’ policy, significantly enhances relations between India and ASEAN. Amid shifting global geopolitical dynamics, the growing partnership between India and ASEAN is well-positioned to play a crucial role in fostering stability and peace in the Indo-Pacific region. India is vital in strengthening ASEAN's centrality in this strategic area. However, several significant challenges impede the deepening of India-ASEAN relations.

First and foremost, India's differing stance on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) presents a considerable obstacle. ASEAN still hopes India will reconsider its position on joining the RCEP.

Another critical challenge arises from the divergent responses to China's increasing regional influence. India’s confrontational approach against China and joining the QUAD complicates its relationship with ASEAN. Many ASEAN nations view the Quad with apprehension, perceiving it as a potential threat to their centrality and a manoeuvre to counter China. ASEAN seeks to avoid becoming embroiled in the power transitions occurring in the Indo-Pacific region.

Many ASEAN nations view the Quad with apprehension, perceiving it as a potential threat to their centrality and a manoeuvre to counter China.

Ultimately, India and ASEAN have yet to elevate their partnership to a more strategic level. Their relationship remains largely superficial, lacking the depth and engagement necessary to address the region's pressing challenges.

First, India-ASEAN trade and investment ties must go beyond Singapore. Second,  maritime cooperation is a cornerstone of security relations between India and ASEAN. Beyond military collaboration, both sides are intensely interested in enhancing maritime infrastructure and improving shipping links. Third,  India and ASEAN have worked closely together at bilateral and multilateral levels. India has established ‘strategic partnerships'’with four key ASEAN nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. Moreover, India has played an active role in various ASEAN-led forums, including the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, reinforcing its commitment to regional stability.

In conclusion, the potential for strengthening India-ASEAN relations is substantial, even amidst challenges. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) can serve as effective platforms to enhance inter-regional connectivity and cooperation between India and ASEAN, paving the way for a more prosperous and secure future for both parties.

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Curie Maharani is the Executive Director of Indo-Pacific Strategic Intelligence, a think tank based in Jakarta.

Wendy A. Prajuli is a PhD student at Humbolt University, Germany.

This article is originally posted in ORF: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/placing-asean-amidst-a-growing-us-china-competition