Why are Indonesians Raging Against the New Military Law?
- ISI Commentaries
- Jun 4
- 5 min read
by: Tangguh Chairil
Indonesian civil society is protesting the possible return of New Order-style military rule

On 20 March 2025, Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR-RI) passed a controversial revision of the law governing the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI). The legislation triggered nationwide protests, with many fearing a revival of “dwifungsi,” the dual-function doctrine that allowed military involvement in political and civilian affairs during Suharto’s New Order regime (1966–1998).
The revised TNI law introduces three major changes: it broadens the scope of TNI’s non-combat operations (Military Operations Other Than War, or MOOTW), expands the number of civilian institutions where active-duty military can serve, and raises the retirement age for TNI personnel. Critics argue these changes threaten Indonesia’s fragile civil-military relations and could mark another step back from post-Reformasi democratic gains.
Importantly, the final draft of the law remains inaccessible to the public, even a month after its passage. This analysis is based on media reports rather than official documents.
Militarization of Cyberspace
The revised law adds new MOOTW responsibilities, including cyber threat mitigation and citizen evacuation abroad. The inclusion of cyber threats raises alarms about potential militarization of cyberspace. Activists warn that this move could lead to heightened surveillance, censorship, and suppression of online dissent.
Nenden Sekar Arum, Executive Director of SAFEnet, cautions that the vague definition of “cyber threats” might allow arbitrary restrictions on online expression. Lab 45 analyst Christian Guntur Lebang argues that cyber threats are still categorized as non-military in the Law on National Defense, suggesting civilian bodies like the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN) should take the lead instead of the TNI.
Increased Military Presence in Civilian Agencies
The new law allows active-duty TNI personnel to serve in additional government bodies such as the agencies for border management (BNPP), disaster relief (BNPB), counterterrorism (BNPT), maritime security (Bakamla), and public prosecution. While some of these roles may appear adjacent to military functions, critics warn that military involvement in civilian institutions risks undermining democratic governance and civilian oversight.
Counterterrorism, for instance, has operated under a criminal justice model, requiring adherence to legal procedures and human rights. Integrating the military could shift the model toward a war model approach, potentially undermining democratic safeguards.
Bhima Yudhistira, Executive Director of Celios, warns that the move could lead to conflicts between military and civilian personnel, inefficiency due to mismatched expertise, and the securitization of non-security issues. It may also demoralize civilian staff and swing development priorities toward military interests.
Extending Retirement Age and Structural Strain
The revision also increases the retirement age for TNI personnel, exacerbating long-standing personnel management issues. Since the fall of the New Order, structural positions within the TNI have been reduced, while recruitment has continued. The result is an abundance of officers without roles.
Rather than scaling down recruitment, the military has sought to create new positions in civilian ministries. Extending the retirement age will further increase the number of officers needing assignments, raising pressure to place them in civilian roles and potentially deepening civil-military entanglement.
Public Distrust and Civil Society Backlash
Although DPR-RI insists the revised law does not bring back dwifungsi, civil society groups remain wary. A March 2025 Kompas poll found that 68.6% of respondents were concerned about overlapping authority if TNI personnel enter civilian institutions, while 69.5% feared a setback to democratic reforms. Despite high public trust in the military (84% according to LSI poll), continued controversies could erode this support.
A petition by human rights NGO Imparsial opposing the law gathered over 61,000 signatures. Since mid-February, student groups and civil society coalitions have protested the law, with demonstrations intensifying after its passage.
Lack of Transparency in Legislative Process
A major source of public anger is the opaque and rushed legislative process. The TNI law revision was not part of the 2025 priority national legislation program approved in November 2024. Yet, on 14–15 March, DPR-RI was caught deliberating the bill in a hotel, away from parliamentary buildings and without media presence. Civil society groups who protested the meeting were forcibly removed by security.
To date, the current draft of the law remains unavailable. When activists challenged provisions posted on the DPR-RI website, lawmakers claimed those were outdated drafts. The public has had to rely on interviews and leaks to learn what was on the bill.
This is not an isolated case. The DPR-RI has previously fast-tracked several controversial laws with minimal public consultation, including the revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) law in 2019, the Omnibus Law on Job Creation in 2020, the Nusantara Capital City (IKN) law in 2021-2022, and changes to the Constitutional Court law.
Government Repression of Protests
In response to protests, the government has deployed military and police forces to guard buildings and suppress dissent, often using excessive force. Several media outlets covering the protests have reported intimidation. These tactics reflect a broader trend of shrinking civic space and democratic backsliding in recent years.
President Prabowo Subianto’s administration has inherited and arguably deepened these trends. Following the 2024 elections, his coalition expanded to control over 81% of parliament. With only one nominal opposition party remaining, often siding with the government, civil society is now the main check on state power.

Looking Ahead: Democracy in Danger
In conclusion, while the revised TNI law does not reintroduce dwifungsi in its original form, it sets a dangerous precedent. Expanding military involvement in civilian affairs, combined with rushed, nontransparent legislative processes and suppression of dissent, threatens to erode Indonesia’s democratic foundations.
Future bills revising the laws on the National Police (Polri) and Public Prosecution could further shift power toward security institutions, increasing the risk of abuse and unaccountability. With institutional checks weakened, civil society remains the last defense—and protests are likely to grow more frequent and intense.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of ISI. The author is solely responsible for the accuracy and authenticity of the information presented.
This content is part of ISI Commentaries to serve the latest comprehensive and reliable analysis on International Relations, security, politics, and social-cultural in Indo-Pacific Region. Read more how to to submit it: https://www.isi-indonesia.com/write-for-us
Defense Policy and Strategic Division
About Author

Comentários