Indonesia, India and the Geopolitical Currents of Indo-Pacific
- ISI Secretariat
- Apr 19
- 6 min read
Key Takeaways
Indonesia can leverage its relationship with India to bridge the interests of Quad and ASEAN, ensuring inclusivity remains a core principle in regional dynamics.
Indonesia emphasizes maritime diplomacy based on inclusivity through AOIP, while India focuses on land security and a strategic competition through Quad.
·The strategic partnership between Indonesia and India is strengthened through defense cooperation, maritime security, and the defense industry to enhance both countries' capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.
Indonesia and India are two major Asian countries with strategic geopolitical positions, particularly in the Indo-Pasific region. Although both play significant roles in regional dynamics, there are fundamental differences in their geopolitical approaches. These differences are influenced by historical factors, geographical location, national interests, and global dynamics shaping each country's foreign policy. Indonesia is situated between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and along the world's major trade routes, including the Malacca Strait, the Sunda Strait, and the Lombok Strait. As the world's largest archipelagic country, Indonesia faces unique challenges in maintaining sovereignty and national stability. Indonesia’s geopolitical focus is on a maritime strategy centered on the "Global Maritime Fulcrum" (Poros Maritim Dunia), emphasizing the importance of strengthening naval power to secure national waters and enhance economic and security ties with neighboring countries.
Meanwhile, India is a subcontinental country with vast land territory, sharing borders with several nations, including Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. This geographical condition makes India's geopolitics more land-oriented, with a primary focus on border security, regional integration, and land-based economic development. However, India also has strategic interests in the Indian Ocean through its "SAGAR" (Security and Growth for All in the Region) policy, which reinforces its role as a dominant maritime power.
Indonesia and India signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership on May 30, 2018, covering cooperation in various sectors, including defense, security, economy, health, and digital technology. Since then, both countries have sought to strengthen bilateral relations amidst the complex geopolitical dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, with maritime security and defense cooperation as the main focus. Joint military exercises, Garuda Shakti and Samudra Shakti between the two countries, as well as Coordinated Patrols are efforts to strengthen maritime security in the Andaman Sea and the Malacca Strait. This practical cooperation shows the increasingly strong defense collaboration for both countries. In addition, the commitment to develop the defense industry has begun to strengthen, marked by the holding of the "India-Indonesia Defense Industry Exhibition cum-Seminar " in Jakarta on April 30, 2024, as well as the purchase of weapons systems such as the BrahMos supersonic missile and cooperation in the defense industry to strengthen Indonesia's military capabilities and increase interoperability between the two armed forces. Intelligence exchange and cyber security are also important parts of strengthening each country's defenses against transnational threats such as terrorism and cross-border crime.
Geopolitical Differences
Geopolitically and geostrategically, India with the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), and Indonesia with the AOIP (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific ) have some similarities in terms of maintaining security and stability in the Indo-Pacific, although their approaches are different. Both have the same interest in maintaining the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. However, the Quad prioritizes security and defense aspects, while the AOIP focuses on diplomacy and economic cooperation. In other words, it can be said that India's approach often emphasizes strategic alignment within its alliances, which may at times create tensions with countries outside these partnerships, while Indonesia prioritizes inclusivity.
The differences in geopolitical maneuvers in the Indo-Pacific, lead to attitudes towards China's influence in the region. India, as a country that borders directly with China and has a border dispute in the Himalayas, sees Beijing's presence as a major challenge. The tensions between India and China in the unresolved border dispute, still trigger clashes. Responding to this, India is improving border infrastructure, such as in the Doklam region. In addition, increasing strategic cooperation with other countries is also being carried out, especially with the United States which includes India in the Strategic Trade Authorization -1 (STA-1) list, allowing the United States to export defense technology to India and position it as a strategic partner.
On the other hand, Indonesia has chosen a more inclusive approach through the AOIP. Towards China, President Prabowo Subianto even increased defense and security cooperation in 2024. As the initiator of the AOIP, Indonesia emphasizes the importance of economic cooperation and regional stability without direct confrontation. Unlike the Quad which tends to be firm in dealing with China, Indonesia adopts a more diplomatic and pragmatic approach, given its significant economic dependence on trade with China. By placing ASEAN as the center of diplomacy and multilateral cooperation, Indonesia seeks to avoid escalation of conflict that could disrupt regional stability. Indonesia adheres to an active free foreign policy, which means not siding with any major power bloc and prioritizing regional cooperation through ASEAN. With this principle, Indonesia focuses more on the stability of the Southeast Asian region and maintaining the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific through a multilateral diplomatic approach. This approach is reflected in Indonesia's active involvement in the AOIP, which aims to maintain regional stability without dependence on external powers.
Indonesia's Strategic Opportunity: Bridging Quad and AOIP
Indonesia has a strategic opportunity to leverage its relationship with India to bridge communication between the Quad and the AOIP. As a fellow Indo-Pacific country that is not fully aligned with the US or China, India is the only Quad member that is also an ASEAN Dialogue Partner and has close ties with Indonesia through the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Therefore, Indonesia can encourage India to adopt the principles of inclusiveness, ASEAN centrality, and a non-confrontational approach in the Quad policy, so that it remains open to ASEAN and is not solely oriented towards confrontation with China. In bilateral forums such as the Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting (2+2 dialogue), Indonesia can strengthen communication with India to ensure that ASEAN's interests remain part of the Quad policy. By making India the "entry point" into the Quad, Indonesia can more easily ensure that the principles of the AOIP remain taken into account in the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific.
As a Quad member and ASEAN Dialogue Partner, India can also play a role as a bridge between the Quad and ASEAN through various mechanisms, such as the ASEAN-India Connectivity , which supports infrastructure development in the region. Indonesia can propose that Quad projects in the Indo-Pacific be aligned with this initiative, so that ASEAN remains central to the regional architecture. In addition, Indonesia can encourage the Indo-Pacific The Oceans Initiative (IPOI) initiated by India is aligned with the AOIP, so that cooperation in the fields of maritime security, marine environment and economic connectivity can take place within a more inclusive framework.
In the area of maritime security, Indonesia and India have common interests in the Indian Ocean and Andaman Sea, which are also strategic areas for the Quad. Bilateral cooperation in the Joint Task Force on Maritime Security and Cooperation and maritime exercises such as Samudra Shakti can be expanded to the regional level to demonstrate how the Quad can support the AOIP without neglecting ASEAN's central role. Furthermore, Indonesia can encourage India not to pull the Quad towards confrontation with China, given that India has a border conflict with China but also has major economic interests with Beijing. Thus, the Quad forum can be used as a mechanism for regional stabilization, not just a tool to confront China, in accordance with the AOIP principle that prioritizes economic and maritime cooperation.
In addition, since India has a unique position as a member of the Quad and as a country close to ASEAN, Indonesia can propose that India play a mediating role in the formal dialogue between ASEAN and the Quad. With India’s involvement, Indonesia can ensure that the Quad remains open to ASEAN in various forms of concrete cooperation, such as in infrastructure, trade, and technology. Encouraging regular meetings such as the ASEAN-Quad Track 1.5 Dialogue will ensure that ASEAN’s interests remain factored into the broader Indo-Pacific strategy.
Thus, India is key for Indonesia in incorporating AOIP into Quad policy . The established strategic relationship can be used to bridge ASEAN and Quad, ensuring that the principles of AOIP remain the main reference in regional cooperation. Through India, Indonesia can maintain the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific without getting caught up in increasingly intense geopolitical rivalries.
Disclaimer
This content is part of ISI Commentaries to serve the latest comprehensive and reliable analysis on International Relations, security, politics, and social-cultural in Indo-Pacific Region. Read more how to to submit it: https://www.isi-indonesia.com/write-for-us
Division: Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy Division
About the writer
Semmy Tyar Armandha is a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies, Research and Development of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. His work focuses on developing strategic assessments for the Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI) forum. He holds a Master’s degree in Defense Studies from the Republic of Indonesia Defense University, with expertise in Southeast Asian geopolitics.
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