Indonesia-India defense cooperation needs institutionalization of trust
- ISI Secretariat
- 1 day ago
- 4 min read
By: Fauzia Cempaka Timur and Curie Maharani
To To anchor Indo-Pacific stability, Indonesia and India must move past historical nostalgia and build a concrete defense partnership that transcends changing political leadership.
When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi meets President Prabowo Subianto in Jakarta, defense and maritime cooperation will undoubtedly top the agenda. Yet, beyond the symbolism of high-level summits, both nations urgently require a clear, long-term strategy to build a sustainable partnership, one capable of enduring successive changes in political leadership.
The foundations of Indonesia–India relations are rooted in shared anti-colonial struggles and early diplomatic solidarity. In 1946, Indonesia launched its "Rice Diplomacy," dispatching 500,000 tonnes of rice to alleviate famine in India. A year later, during the 1947 Asian Relations Conference, India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, openly opposed Dutch military aggression against Indonesia.
By the 1950s, bilateral ties had expanded into the security realm, culminating in their first joint naval exercise in 1960. However, this early momentum stalled as the Cold War intensified and the two nations navigated divergent geopolitical paths.
The post-Cold War era reopened avenues for bilateral cooperation and deepened India's engagement with ASEAN. India joined the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996 and has included Indonesia and other member states in its MILAN naval exercises since 1997. By 2023, New Delhi had established varying levels of defense cooperation with nine ASEAN states.
A poignant example of this camaraderie occurred during the 2021 COVID-19 pandemic, when India offered critical assistance in the rescue operation for the missing Indonesian submarine Nanggala, a gesture that, unfortunately, received little public attention in Indonesia.
Bilateral defense ties reached a new milestone with the 2001 Defense Cooperation Framework Agreement, followed by a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in 2018. In the years between, the relationship was sustained by high-level visits, strategic dialogues and joint military exercises.
However, defense industrial cooperation remains virtually non-existent. The only notable business-to-business initiative to date has been a plan to co-produce water cannon vehicles between Indonesia's state arms producer PT Pindad and India's Tata Motors. This limited progress reflects a persistent, mutual unfamiliarity with each other’s strategic intentions and industrial capabilities.
In reality, Jakarta and New Delhi share more strategic similarities than is commonly recognized. First, both pursue defense self-reliance as a natural extension of their independent foreign policy traditions, bebas-aktif (independent and active) for Indonesia, and "strategic autonomy" for India. Second, both operationalize this principle by diversifying arms procurement while simultaneously trying to strengthen indigenous defense sectors. Because they employ different strategies to achieve these goals, both nations possess valuable lessons learned that could be mutually beneficial.
Both countries face similar procurement bottlenecks. As longtime operators of Russian military equipment, both have had to navigate the United States' Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which restricts access to Russian weapon systems and spare parts.
India, traditionally Russia's largest defense customer, has successfully diversified its procurement toward Western suppliers. Indonesia, while never heavily dependent on a single supplier, has similarly shifted toward partners perceived as politically neutral, including France and Turkey. How India managed the threat of sanctions while successfully concluding the delivery of the Russian S-400 Triumf air defense system offers a highly valuable case study for Indonesian policymakers.
Strategically, both nations share an interest in maintaining stability across the Indo-Pacific amid intensifying great-power rivalry and rising tensions in the South China Sea. India borders three ASEAN members, by sea with Indonesia and Thailand, and by land with Myanmar, giving it a direct stake in the security of continental Asia and the Malacca Strait.
One notable but unrealized initiative proposed by India in 2018 is the strategic corridor linking the Andaman and Nicobar Islands with Aceh. The project seeks to improve maritime connectivity and trade across the Bay of Bengal, yet it remains on the drawing board.
The incentives to strengthen ties are abundant. Under Prime Minister Modi, India's Act East policy positions New Delhi not just as a security provider in the Indian Ocean, but as an emerging defense technology supplier for Southeast Asia. On the Indonesian side, legislative ratification of the DCA paved the way for broader operational engagement. Political momentum has been reinforced by reciprocal high-level diplomacy: President Prabowo was invited as the chief guest at India's Republic Day celebrations, followed by Prime Minister Modi's return visit to Jakarta.
Cooperation is also expanding into the analytical domain. The Indian Embassy in Jakarta sponsored a joint study by Indo-Pacific Strategic Intelligence (ISI) and the National Maritime Foundation. For the first time, the defense industrial bases of both countries were systematically mapped.
The findings suggest potential complementarity. India has more than 400 defense companies, including over 150 that produce spare parts and components. Indonesia, meanwhile, has more than 275 defense-related firms, although fewer than 30 manufacture components. These differences create opportunities for industrial partnerships rather than competition.
The 2026 Indonesia–India summit therefore presents an opportunity to translate long-standing aspirations into concrete cooperation. To achieve this, both sides must prioritize the institutionalization of trust. It is built not on sentiment but through predictable institutional behavior, regular engagement and sustained cooperation. This requires a tapestry of activities and layered engagement.
Dialogue between defense ministers needs to be complemented by regular interoperability-focused military exercises and education and training between the soldiers. Defense industrial collaboration between companies needs to be supported by 1.5-track forum and joint research involving experts from think tank and academia.
Ultimately, whether the DCA becomes a living framework rather than a paper tiger will depend on the sustained commitment of both the Indonesian and Indian governments to these practical steps. If these foundations can be established, Indonesia and India will be better positioned to transform historical goodwill into a resilient strategic partnership capable of contributing to long-term stability in the Indo-Pacific.
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About Authors
Fauzia Cempaka Timur is a senior analyst at the Indo-Pacific Strategic Intelligence (ISI) Indonesia. Curie Maharani is a lecturer at Binus University.
This article originally appeared on The Jakarta Post under the title 'Indonesia-India defense cooperation needs institutionalization of trust' on July 7, 2026.
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