Closing the Gap Between Indonesia's Arms Procurement and Its Force Structure Requirements
By: Tangguh Chairil
Edited for publication by: Dr. Fauzia G. Cempaka Timur, Senior Analyst ISI
Indonesia is rebuilding its armed forces at a pace not seen in decades. Aircraft are arriving from Europe, ships are being added to the fleet, and new contracts are signed almost every year. The harder question is whether all this buying is producing the force that Indonesia's own doctrine says it needs. The analysis assesses the extent to which procurement spending has translated into weapon systems that meet Indonesia’s stated force structure requirements, while highlighting procurement choices worth re-examining.
Rising Military Expenditure and Procurement
Since 2020, Indonesia's military spending has climbed sharply. In constant 2024 US dollars, it rose from US$ 9.67 billion in 2020 to US$ 15.32 billion in 2025, a fifty eight percent rise. In rupiah, defense function spending rose from Rp 136.9 trillion in 2020 to Rp 348.6 trillion in 2025. The 2026 outlook eases to Rp 299.1 trillion, meanwhile the government has allocated Rp 329.5 trillion for 2027’s Proposed State Budget (RAPBN).
During this period, Indonesia has ordered and acquired Rafale fighter aircraft, Garibaldi aircraft carrier (now renamed KRI Sriwijaya-100), C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, and A400M Atlas transport aircraft, Scorpène-class submarines, Arrowhead 140 frigates/Balaputradewa-frigates, Istif-class frigates, and KF-21 Boramae fighter aircraft. Indonesia has also expressed interest in various other major weapon systems, such as F-15EX fighter aircraft, J-10 fighter aircraft, Il-78 tanker aircraft. Diversifying suppliers offers real strategic benefits. It lessens reliance on a single partner and fosters industrial collaboration at PT PAL. The key question is whether this approach is supported by the necessary resources and planning to transform it into effective capability.
Force Structure Requirements
Despite this spending, acquisitions have only partly translated into Indonesia's own requirements, set out in the Perisai Trisula Nusantara (PTN) doctrine and the Optimum Essential Force (OEF). President Prabowo Subianto introduced the PTN as Minister of Defense in a hearing with the House of Representatives (DPR) in 2021. He also presented the PTN to the National Police Staff College (Sespim Lemdiklat Polri) in 2023. It then became a new doctrine of the Indonesian Military (TNI) in 2026.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense announced the OEF to replace the Minimum Essential Force (MEF), which guided arms modernization in 2010-2024, for the period of 2025-2044. It took effect after the 2025-2029 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) was published. There is no publicly available document that details PTN or OEF force structure, so analysts usually use Prabowo’s 2023 presentation as framework for the force structure.
The Gaps: Procurement Falls Short of Stated Targets
The Lab 45’s Indonesia Weapon Systems Database, an open-source TNI tracker, benchmarks procurement against the OEF and estimates PTN fulfillment; its figures are indicative rather than official. As of 11 September 2026, PTN fulfillment has risen only 1 percentage point since 2021, while current systems reach only 27% of the MEF phase III targets that were supposed to have been achieved by 2024. Deficits persist across all Army categories. For the Navy, shortfalls remain in surface combatants, submarines, naval aviation, and marine armor, while targets are exceeded only for coastal and ship-based missiles. For the Air Force, deficits continue in transport and ISR aircraft and search-and-rescue helicopters, while targets are exceeded for fighter aircraft, trainer aircraft, and air-surveillance radars. This indicates that its procurement efforts have not always aligned with the areas where the gaps are widest.
Procurement Choices Worth Re-Examining
Fighter aircraft procurement illustrates the growing complexity of its defense inventory. Indonesia ordered the Rafale in 2022, deliveries from 2026; signed for 48 Kaan fighter aircraft in 2025; and signaled interest in J-10 and JF-17 fighter aircraft while ordering 12 M-346 light combat aircraft in 2026. With these additions, Indonesia’s fighter fleet would draw on eight countries: the US (F-16), Russia (Su-27, Su-30), France (Rafale), Turkey (KAAN), South Korea (KF-21, T-50), the UK (Hawk), Brazil (EMB 314), and Italy (M-346). Analysts call this a significant maintenance and interoperability challenge; the practical test is whether Indonesia's training and maintenance institutions can absorb that complexity.
Air-Power Enabler Remains a Critical Gap
Recent conflicts have sparked debate over whether effective air power depends on capabilities beyond fighter jets. Electronic warfare (EW), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), airborne early warning and control (AEW&C), and aerial refueling aircraft are increasingly important in maintaining situational awareness and operational effectiveness. The May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, in which Pakistan reported downing several Indian fighters, including Rafales, is instructive, though battle-damage claims remain contested. Pakistani and open-source reporting suggest electronic-warfare activity degraded Indian pilots' situational awareness — underscoring that even advanced fighters depend on supporting systems. TNI-AU currently lacks dedicated electronic warfare or AEW&C aircraft. Indonesia planned to acquire two AEW&C aircraft in 2023. Delivering these AEW&C aircrafts should be prioritized because the TNI-AU currently has none. Without these supporting capabilities, investments in advanced fighter aircraft alone may not deliver their full operational value.
The Unplanned Costs of Carrier Acquisition
A further case is the carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi, now KRI Sriwijaya-100. Indonesia had not previously planned for a carrier, and TNI-AL has focused on green-water and limited blue-water capabilities rather than air-power projection. Interest in the Italian carrier was announced in 2025, and the ship arrived in September 2026. This represents a rapid 18-month timeline. Though the transfer was free, modernizing the 40-year-old vessel and sustaining its operations will require a substantial budget. That budget must also cover escort ships and, if the carrier is assigned anti-submarine or UAV roles rather than strike missions, embarked helicopters. Early and transparent publication of this plan would strengthen confidence in the acquisition.
Delayed Development of Submarine-Rescue Capability
That pace contrasts with the slower timeline for submarine rescue capability. After the 2021 sinking of KRI Nanggala, analysts called for submarine rescue ships and deep-submergence rescue vehicles (DSRVs). However, that capability only came with KRI Canopus in 2026, five years later. The five-year gap highlights the need for future planning to prioritize timely acquisition of capabilities required for urgent operational needs.
These cases show that Indonesia's defense spending does not always match its force structure needs. Defense spending often competes with civilian areas like education and healthcare. So, planning based on requirements is key for cost-effectiveness. To improve this, it’s important to strengthen the link between procurement and the PTN/OEF frameworks. This can be done by fully disclosing targets, documenting gaps, and aligning new platforms with sustainment budgets. These steps would ensure that defense investments effectively build the capabilities Indonesia's doctrine requires. This way, decisions will not create unnecessary risks in modernizing the country’s force structure.
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About Authors
Tangguh Chairil, S.Sos., M.Si.(Han) is an Indonesian academic, lecturer, and defense analyst specializing in the Department of International Relations at Bina Nusantara (BINUS) University. He is a prominent expert in international security, defense economics, intelligence studies, and military affairs in Southeast Asia.
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