A Month of Diplomacy: Why Indonesia Must Remember that Ideas, not Arms Alone, Built the Nation
- ISI Secretariat
- 2 hours ago
- 4 min read
By: Dr. Muhammad Hadianto
August is a month of diplomacy for Indonesia. Two days following the nation’s proclamation of independence, on 19 August 1945, the young republic established its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu), signalling that the fledgling state understood that sovereignty declared at home meant little unless it was argued for, defended and recognised abroad.
That sequencing was no accident. Our founding fathers grasped that Indonesia’s struggle would be won not only on the battlefield (perjuangan) but in the realm of ideas (kejuangan). The revolution that followed relied heavily on internationalising the Indonesian cause, carrying the argument for self-determination to the UN, to sympathetic governments in Asia and to the conscience of a decolonising world. When the nation secured recognition through the Round Table Conference from 23 August to 2 November 1949, it was diplomacy, framed around the moral legitimacy of independence, that consolidated what force alone could not guarantee. August, then, is not merely a season of ceremony. It is a true reminder that Indonesia was, from its first breath, an idea in search of recognition.
The intellectual signature of Indonesia’s founding diplomacy was the independent and active (bebas-aktif) foreign policy. Articulated by Hatta in 1948 as a refusal to row between two great powers, it was a values proposition before it was a strategic one. It expressed a conviction about who Indonesia was, or aspired to be: a nation unwilling to trade one form of subordination for another. That conviction matured into the non-aligned tradition and the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, where Soekarno offered the postcolonial world not weapons but a vocabulary that consists of sovereignty, coexistence, and solidarity. Indonesia’s diplomacy, to put it differently, has always been ideas-driven. Its greatest exports have been principles, and its most durable form of power has been thought leadership – as former Foreign Minister Natalegawa recently admitted on a Jakarta Post podcast.
Theoretically speaking, this is where the scholarly distinction between realism and constructivism becomes practical rather than academic. Realism, on the one hand, reads the world as a contest of capabilities in which security flows from material strength. Constructivism, on the other hand, holds that a state’s conduct is shaped by identity, norms and the ideas it holds about itself and others. Indonesia’s diplomatic history is, by and large, a marriage of the two. The nation has never been naïve about power. It has pursued a credible defence, guarded its archipelagic integrity and read regional balances with realist clarity. Yet, it has consistently projected an identity as a bridge-builder and a champion of the Global South, as well as a guardian of regional autonomy. Scholarship on Indonesia’s foreign policy, including work examining how democratisation reshaped its promotion of political values, confirms that identity and ideas have remained central to how the country conceives of and conducts its diplomacy.
Today, a subtle shift is apparent. National strength is increasingly pictured through the lens of arms superiority informed by platform acquisition, budget expansion, and hardware display. Modernising a long-neglected military is legitimate and prudent, given the strategic turbulence of the Indo-Pacific. But there is a quiet cost. The nation risks forgetting that its most distinctive asset has always been the persuasiveness of its ideas. Arms and ideas are not rivals. A confident defence posture and a values-driven diplomacy can, and historically did, coexist. Our founding fathers have proven that credibility abroad rests on both the capacity to defend and the clarity of what one is defending.
So, if August is to mean more than commemoration, three commitments must serve as an aspiration for policymakers to achieve.
First, institutionalise ideas as a strategy. Indonesia should establish a standing, well-resourced foreign policy doctrine review by linking the foreign ministry, the defence establishment and the epistemic community, so that every capability acquisition is paired with an articulated and coordinated strategic idea it serves. To this end, one must be able to identify the linked dots between Perisai Trisula Nusantara and the Bebas-Aktif – both are doctrines of defence and diplomacy of the nation, respectively.
Second, as a G20 economy, a BRICS power, and ASEAN’s natural convenor, Indonesia should invest in agenda-setting and reclaim the thought leadership in the Indo-Pacific. From maritime norms to digital sovereignty and a rules-based regional order, the nation should not merely respond to the initiatives of others. Instead, Indonesia should be at the forefront in convening nations and generating ideas that contribute to a world order underpinned by independence, lasting peace, and social justice.
And finally, integrate defence and diplomacy into a single narrative of strength. Every move in defence modernisation should be communicated, at home and abroad, as an extension of bebas-aktif. The countries beyond our borders should know that what Indonesia is performing is rather capability in the service of autonomy, not adventurism. Strength stated in the language of values reassures partners and deters rivals more effectively than strength stated in the language of arms alone.
Eighty-one years on, the lesson of that first August in our history still holds. Indonesia was born of an idea, defended by conviction, and secured by diplomacy. Its future strength will be ultimate when its arms and its ideas advance together. Merdeka!!
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About Authors
The writer is Founder and Chairman of the Advisory Council of the Indo-Pacific Strategic Intelligence (ISI) and a Lecturer at the Faculty of Defence Strategy of the Indonesian Defence University. The views expressed are his own.
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