Comparing the Transparency Policies of the Philippines and Indonesia in the Context of the Natuna Sea and the South China Sea

By: Dr. Surya Wiranto, SH MH[1]

Dr. Surya Wiranto, SH, MH is a retired Rear Admiral of the Indonesian Navy, Senior Advisor at Indo-Pacific Strategic Intelligence (ISI), Senior Advisory Group Member of IKAHAN Indonesia–Australia, and Lecturer in Maritime Security Studies at the Indonesian Defense University (Unhan). He also serves as Head of the National Resilience Department at PEPABRI, Secretary General of the IKAL Strategic Center, and Executive Director of the Indonesia Institute for Maritime Studies (IIMS). He is an active Advocate, Curator, and Mediator at Legal Jangkar Indonesia.

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Abstract

The Philippines’ transparency initiative, launched in 2023, has become a central component of its strategic communication and lawfare posture in the South China Sea. By systematically publicising coercive actions undertaken by the China Coast Guard, Manila seeks to strengthen domestic mobilisation, attract international support, and reinforce the normative authority of UNCLOS. Indonesia, despite experiencing comparable intrusions in the North Natuna Sea, refrains from adopting a similar approach. This divergence is shaped by structural constraints, economic interdependence with China, and the increasingly pragmatic orientation of President Prabowo Subianto’s foreign policy. Using a comparative framework grounded in maritime security studies and international political economy, this paper argues that transparency functions effectively as a norm-shaping instrument but yields limited deterrence value. Indonesia’s preference for quiet diplomacy reflects a deliberate balancing strategy that prioritises economic resilience while maintaining legal consistency under UNCLOS.

Keywords: Maritime Transparency, Strategic Communication, South China Sea, Natuna Sea, Indonesia, Philippines, China, International Political Economy.

Introduction

Source: C.I.A., NASA, China Maritime Safety Administration

The South China Sea dispute represents one of the most salient maritime security challenges in contemporary Indo-Pacific geopolitics. Competing claims, asymmetrical power relations, and the absence of effective regional enforcement mechanisms have compelled Southeast Asian states to adopt diverse strategies to safeguard their maritime interests. The Philippines and Indonesia, while differing in their legal status within the dispute, both face increasingly frequent incursions by Chinese maritime law enforcement actors.

Since 2023, Manila has institutionalised a transparency initiative that foregrounds the dissemination of visual and documentary evidence of China’s coercive behaviour. This initiative is not merely an information policy but a deliberate instrument of strategic communication, lawfare, and alliance management. Conversely, Indonesia adopts a markedly different posture, relying on non-public diplomatic mechanisms, asserting its legal position through notes verbales, and avoiding measures that could be construed as “megaphone diplomacy.”

The contrasting approaches raise important theoretical and empirical questions. How does transparency function as a tool of strategic statecraft? What conditions determine whether states adopt public-exposure strategies versus quiet diplomacy? And why do two states facing analogous maritime pressures arrive at divergent policy choices? This article addresses these questions by situating the Philippines-Indonesia comparison within broader debates on asymmetric deterrence, maritime governance, and economic statecraft.

Geopolitical Context And Theoretical Framework

The Philippines operates within a geopolitical environment shaped by contested sovereignty, historical antagonism, and the legal authority conferred by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling. The award invalidated China’s nine-dash line claims, strengthening Manila’s recourse to lawfare and transparency as mutually reinforcing strategies. Transparency serves to internationalise the dispute, generate reputational costs for China, and legitimise deeper cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia.

Indonesia, by contrast, is not a claimant state but a coastal state whose EEZ overlaps with China’s historic rights claims. Jakarta’s longstanding policy of asserting that “no territorial dispute exists” serves both legal and diplomatic purposes: it preserves Indonesia’s position under UNCLOS while preventing China from reframing the issue as a bilateral sovereignty negotiation. Within this framing, excessive transparency may inadvertently elevate China’s claim or alter Indonesia’s strategic narrative.

Theoretically, the divergence can be analysed through two lenses. First, strategic communication theory suggests that transparency enhances agenda-setting power and shapes international expectations. Second, international political economy highlights how asymmetric economic interdependence constrains foreign policy autonomy. Together, these frameworks illuminate why transparency is politically advantageous for Manila but strategically costly for Jakarta.

Problem Analysis

Manila’s transparency initiative functions as a norm entrepreneurship strategy aimed at delegitimising China’s conduct under UNCLOS. The public release of videos depicting the use of water cannons, lasers, and high-risk manoeuvres creates evidentiary records that amplify reputational pressure. The initiative also strengthens domestic political resolve by framing the dispute as an issue of sovereignty defence and maritime rights.

However, transparency has shown limited deterrence effect. Chinese incursions have persisted, indicating that while reputational costs may rise, Beijing’s strategic calculus remains largely unchanged. This outcome aligns with scholarship suggesting that norm-based contestation rarely compels behavioural change from major powers with high resolve.

Indonesia’s reluctance to adopt a similar initiative is grounded in economic and political considerations. China is Indonesia’s second-largest investor, contributing more than US$3 billion in 2023 compared with the Philippines’ US$155 million. Jakarta’s development agenda, including industrialisation and infrastructure priorities, relies heavily on continued inflows of Chinese capital. Any public exposure strategy risks triggering economic retaliation, as observed in China’s responses to other middle-power states.

Moreover, Indonesia’s defence posture lacks the alliance backing enjoyed by Manila. Without a formal security guarantor, Jakarta perceives transparency as a potentially escalatory act that could increase operational risks without offering compensatory strategic benefits. The Prabowo administration’s openness to joint development with China further reflects a pragmatic orientation prioritising economic gains over confrontational signalling.

Policy Options For Indonesia

A wholesale adoption of the Philippine model is neither politically feasible nor strategically optimal for Indonesia. Nevertheless, transparency appropriately calibrated remains a useful tool. Indonesia could develop a limited transparency framework emphasising technical, data-driven disclosures rather than political narratives. This could include periodic maritime domain awareness reports, satellite-based intrusion maps, and AIS-based independent verification mechanisms.

Such an approach would preserve Indonesia’s legal consistency under UNCLOS, strengthen its evidentiary basis in potential international adjudication, and counter China’s historical claims without triggering direct diplomatic confrontation. Furthermore, Indonesia could integrate transparency into regional mechanisms such as the ASEAN Maritime Outlook or the ASEAN Coast Guard Forum to diffuse political sensitivity.

Action And Implementation

Operationalising calibrated transparency requires institutional, diplomatic, and economic measures. Institutionally, Indonesia must enhance inter-agency cooperation among Bakamla, TNI AL, KKP, and satellite-surveillance bodies to ensure coherent data collection and dissemination. Diplomatic action involves increased publication of legal documents to reinforce Indonesia’s maritime entitlement claims at the global level.

Economically, diversification remains critical. Reducing structural dependence on China would expand Indonesia’s strategic bandwidth to pursue more assertive maritime signalling without incurring prohibitive costs. This aligns with long-term national resilience objectives.

Conclusion

The comparison between the Philippines and Indonesia demonstrates that transparency is not merely an information-management tool but a strategic instrument embedded within broader geopolitical and economic structures. While Manila employs transparency to generate international pressure and mobilise legal norms, Indonesia’s preference for quiet diplomacy reflects a careful balancing strategy that integrates legal consistency, risk management, and economic pragmatism.

Transparency, therefore, is neither universally applicable nor uniformly effective. Its utility depends on alliance structures, economic interdependence, legal positioning, and domestic political priorities. For Indonesia, the most viable path lies in a calibrated transparency model that strengthens normative authority without undermining economic stability. Such a model would not only preserve Indonesia’s strategic autonomy but also enhance its capacity to navigate an increasingly contested maritime Indo-Pacific.

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References

1. Batongbacal, J. (2023). Maritime Transparency and the South China Sea Disputes. Manila: University of the Philippines Law Center.

2. Storey, I. (2024). China’s Maritime Coercion in Southeast Asia. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute.

3. Poling, G. (2023). The Philippines’ Transparency Initiative: Implications for Regional Security. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.

4. Prescott, V., & Schofield, C. (2020). The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World. Leiden: Brill.

5. Kaplan, R. (2014). Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific. New York: Random House.